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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge 
 
We are asked on this appeal to determine whether the 
District Court erred in releasing the funds of certain 
investors from a freeze order entered in the context of 
receivership proceedings instituted by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Appellants are several Pennsylvania 
school districts who invested funds with defendants. They 
contend that the District Court orders of May 11 and May 
22, 1998 improperly released funds of other investors, 
denied appellants certain procedural rights in connection 
with the court proceedings attendant thereto, and also 
erred in its award of attorneys' fees to the equity receiver 
appointed in the case. Appellees not only counter these 
positions, but also challenge our jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal. 
 
Appellants appeal from five orders entered by the District 
Court in the ongoing receivership proceedings instituted by 
the SEC against John Gardner Black ("Black"), Devon 
Capital Management, Inc. ("Devon"), and Financial 
Management Sciences, Inc. ("FMS") under the provisions of 
Section 20(b) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77t(b), 
Sections 21(d) and (e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
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S 78u(d), (e), and Section 209(d) of the Advisors Act, 15 
U.S.C. S 80b-9(d). The five orders at issue include an April 
7, 1998 order approving payment of attorneys' fees and 
expenses ("fee order"), an April 22, 1998 order adopting 
procedures for a hearing regarding the distribution of funds 
and an April 27, 1998 order modifying the April 22 order 
("procedural orders"), and a May 11, 1998 order modifying 
a freeze order and a May 22, 1998 order modifying the May 
11 order ("orders lifting the freeze"). 
 
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the 
procedural orders and the orders lifting the freeze. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
In August 1997, during a routine investigation of Devon, 
the SEC discovered that Devon was carrying assets on its 
books at materially inflated values and had incurred 
massive trading losses totaling at least $50 million of the 
$345 million entrusted to it by its investment clients. The 
investigation also determined that Devon and Black 1 were 
concealing the losses from their clients, most of whom were 
school districts and governmental entities, and were 
continuing to accept funds from new investment clients 
without disclosing information regarding these losses. The 
SEC believed that Devon was seeking new clients so as to 
use their funds to fulfill obligations to existing clients under 
their investment advisory agreements. On September 26, 
1997, the SEC filed an action in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against 
Black, Devon and FMS seeking to enjoin their illegal 
conduct and freeze their assets pending an investigation. 
The SEC alleged violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities 
Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77q(a), Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 
15 U.S.C. S 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.S 240.10b-5, 
promulgated thereunder against Black, Devon and FMS, 
and violations of Sections 206(1), (2) and (4) of the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. SS 80b-6(1), 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Black was the president, portfolio manager, and sole shareholder of 
Devon, a registered investment adviser, headquartered in Tyrone, 
Pennsylvania. Black was also the owner of FMS, an entity affiliated with 
Devon and incorporated in Pennsylvania. 
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80b-6(2), 80b-6(4), and Rule 206(4)-2, 17 C.F.R. 
S 275.206(4)-2, promulgated thereunder against Black and 
Devon. 
 
The District Court granted the SEC's motion for entry of 
a temporary restraining order whereby all assets "presently 
held by [defendants], under their control or over which they 
exercise actual or apparent investment or other authority, 
in whatever form such assets may presently exist and 
wherever located" were to be immediately frozen. The order 
was entered pursuant to Section 20(b) of the Securities Act, 
15 U.S.C. S 77t(b), Sections 21(d) and (e) of the Exchange 
Act, 15 U.S.C. S 78u(d), (e), and Section 209(d) of the 
Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C. S 80b-9(d). Pursuant to this order, 
the customer accounts later categorized as A, B, C and D 
were frozen. 
 
The court appointed Richard Thornburgh as the equity 
receiver ("Trustee"), and he employed Price Waterhouse, LLP 
to provide accounting and auditing services for the ensuing 
investigation. The Trustee identified four general categories 
of investment relationships between defendants and their 
investor clients. Category A clients entered into an 
investment advisory and management relationship with 
Devon whereby Devon had authority to direct the purchase 
and sale of securities investments held in the name of the 
client at the client's custodian bank. Category A includes 
clients who entered into investment management 
arrangements whereby the client bore the risk and benefit 
of performance of investments, clients with investment 
advisor arrangements with a guaranteed minimum rate of 
return whereby Devon bore the risk of investments, and 
clients with investment advisor arrangements with afixed 
rate of return whereby Devon bore the risk, and would reap 
the benefit, of investments. Category B includes those 
clients who entered into Repurchase Agreements ("Repos") 
and Non-Pooled Collateralized Investment Agreements 
("CIAs") with defendants. Under Repos, Devon used client 
funds to buy securities, chosen by Devon, at a set price, 
and later would re-sell the securities at a set, higher price, 
providing an assured return. The securities were held in the 
interim in the client's name by a custodian bank which 
held a promise of Devon's repurchase obligation. The Repos 
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required Devon to provide additional securities on behalf of 
the client if the securities' value fell below the set purchase 
price. Under non-pooled CIAs, Devon used clients' funds to 
invest in FMS "units" that were credited to the client's 
account. FMS promised a fixed rate of return to the client 
and granted the client a security interest in securities held 
by a custodian bank. Category C clients entered into 
agreements with Devon similar to B non-pooled CIAs, 
except that the securities serving as collateral for the FMS 
"units" were pooled in one account in the name of FMS at 
Mid-State Bank ("MSB"). Category D clients entered into 
investment management arrangements with Devon similar 
to the A clients, except that MSB served as the custodian 
of the D accounts. As with the A and B accounts, the D 
accounts were held in the clients' names. Pursuant to the 
foregoing agreements, the defendants managed the 
accounts of A, B and D clients, while the actual funds or 
securities of those clients remained either in their own 
names or with a custodian bank named by them, other 
than MSB. The funds and/or securities invested by clients 
of the C accounts were maintained in a pooled account in 
the name of FMS in its principal depository bank, MSB. The 
present shortfall in assets is primarily in the pooled 
account at MSB. As of September 30, 1997, although 
approximately $156,000,000 had been invested in pooled 
CIAs on behalf of the C clients, the value of the collateral 
underlying the pooled account was only approximately 
$86,000,000. 
 
After assessing the different types of contractual 
arrangements that existed, the Trustee investigated the 
extent to which defendants used the pooled account 
holding the C clients' funds in order to sell securities to, 
purchase securities from, or grant collateral to, clients that 
were in the other categories of investment relationships 
with defendants. The Trustee believes that through the use 
of the pooled account, defendants may have used certain 
funds deposited by the C clients for the benefit of the A, B 
and D clients. The Trustee has attempted to identify and 
quantify examples of such transactions, using the term 
"cash taints" to refer to cash transfers from the pooled 
account to accounts of non-pooled clients without the 
receipt of consideration, and the term "securities taints" to 
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refer to transfers of securities between pooled and non- 
pooled clients at non-market prices, benefitting the non- 
pooled clients at the expense of the pooled account. 2 In 
addition, evidence suggests that defendants used the 
pooled account to fund lawsuits, settle complaints, and pay 
FMS's operational expenses. The Trustee has not alleged 
any complicity or actual involvement of the holders of the 
A, B and D accounts in this allegedly fraudulent scheme 
under investigation by the SEC. 
 
Following the initial freeze order, the Trustee and the 
SEC jointly filed a motion on October 27, 1997 to modify 
the freeze to allow a distribution to the A, B and D clients 
of 50% of the market value of the funds held in their name, 
and to allow a distribution to the C clients of 50% of the 
market value of their pro rata share of the assets held in 
the pooled account. The District Court entered an order to 
allow this proposed distribution. On March 10, 1998, the 
Trustee filed a motion for further modification of the freeze 
to permit a second distribution to the investment advisory 
clients. This motion proposed a distribution to the A, B and 
D clients of 90% of the assets held in their name, reduced 
by the estimated total dollar value of whatever "taints" were 
identified by the Trustee, and a distribution to the C clients 
of 90% of their pro rata share of the remaining market 
value of the assets in the pooled account. The Trustee 
requested that funds sufficient to cover the alleged tainted 
transactions remain subject to the freeze pending afinal 
resolution by the court concerning the entitlement to such 
funds. On March 18, 1998, the District Court entered an 
order setting an April 29, 1998 hearing date on the motion 
for the proposed second interim distribution. The court also 
allowed all investment clients to file any objections to the 
motion with the Trustee and the SEC. On April 22, 1998 
the District Court entered a hearing management order 
setting forth the procedures to be followed during the April 
29, 1998 hearing. In response to an emergency motionfiled 
by several of appellants, the court revised these procedures 
in an April 27 order. The District Court conducted a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Spread sheets prepared by Price Waterhouse indicated possible cash 
taints totaling approximately $3.1 million and possible securities taints 
totaling approximately $20.8 million. 
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hearing on the motion for a second distribution on April 29 
and April 30. In a Memorandum Opinion entered May 11, 
1998, the District Court directed the Trustee to release the 
funds of all A, B and D clients from the freeze, and to 
distribute to the C clients 90% of each client's pro rata 
share of the remaining pooled assets. The order also 
granted the C clients permission to initiate actions against 
the A, B and D clients to recover alleged taints. The District 
Court revised the May 11 order in an order entered May 22, 
whereby the court discussed the method of distribution of 
funds to the C clients and granted all C clients the right to 
intervene in this action. In addition, on April 7, 1998, the 
District Court issued an order approving the Trustee's 
application for payment of attorneys' fees and expenses of 
approximately $1.6 million. 
 
The District Court receivership proceedings are still 
pending. On July 7, 1998, several of the C clients, 
representing a subset of appellants, instituted involuntary 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings against Devon and FMS 
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania. Although the Trustee moved to 
dismiss the Bankruptcy Court proceedings based upon his 
view that the receivership before the District Court was 
adequate, the Bankruptcy Court declined to do so, ruling 
that: 
 
       In spite of the arguments by the trustee, we are not 
       sufficiently persuaded that dismissal at this time would 
       better serve the interests of debtors and their creditors. 
       We instead find it advisable to permit these bankruptcy 
       cases to proceed to determine whether they provide a 
       better process for resolving issues left unresolved by 
       the district court. 
 
The appeals before us have resulted in a flurry of activity 
and filings by various parties, including motions on behalf 
of many of the A, B and D investors to intervene, which we 
granted. In addition to appellants' brief, the School District 
of Lancaster and Penn Manor School District havefiled an 
amicus brief requesting that the orders lifting the freeze be 
affirmed. Intervenors Bellefonte Area School District, 
Cornwall-Lebanon School District, Cumberland Valley 
School District, Fleetwood Area School District, and 
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Richland School District filed a brief urging that the instant 
appeal be dismissed or that the District Court orders 
appealed from be affirmed. Intervenor North Hills School 
District filed a brief urging that the appeal be dismissed or 
that the orders appealed from be affirmed. Intervenor 
Richland School District filed a brief urging this court to 
affirm the orders lifting the freeze and to reverse the fee 
order, except to the extent that such reversal would require 
Richland to contribute in payment of such fees. Intervenors 
St. Johns Welfare Federation, The Harrisburg Authority and 
The City of Harrisburg, The University of Scranton, and 
Bradford Regional Medical Center filed a brief urging this 
court to affirm the orders lifting the freeze. We requested 
the filing of a brief by the SEC. The only party not actually 
before us on this appeal is the Trustee.3  
 
II. JURISDICTION 
 
We first address the contested issue of our jurisdiction to 
review the orders of the District Court from which this 
appeal has been taken. 
 
In view of the continued existence and effectiveness of the 
restraining order for several months from and after 
September 1997, we conclude that it had effectively 
matured into a preliminary injunction. See Nutrasweet Co. 
v. Vit-Mar Enter., 112 F.3d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding 
that a TRO in effect for 77 days was equivalent to a 
preliminary injunction); see also Sampson v. Murray, 415 
U.S. 61, 88 (1974) (holding that the continuation of a TRO 
beyond its authorization had the same effect as a 
preliminary injunction); In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee 
Litig., 689 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that 
the TRO in effect beyond its statutory limits was effectively 
a preliminary injunction even though the parties consented 
to its extension). The orders lifting the freeze, therefore, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court determined, for reasons not apparent to us on the 
record before us, that the Trustee had a conflict of interest in this 
matter 
and disqualified the Trustee from being a party to the matter on appeal. 
Although we would have welcomed the Trustee's views with respect to 
this matter, we believe that we have an adequate record based upon the 
briefs and argument of those parties to this appeal. 
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constituted orders modifying an injunction, from which an 
interlocutory appeal is permissible under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(a)(1), which provides jurisdiction over appeals from 
"[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts . . . modifying 
. . . injunctions . . . ." Despite the characterization of this 
order by various parties as a "turnover" order and the 
District Court's own use of the phrase "return of 100% of 
the principal," the court's May 11 and May 22, 1998 orders 
merely lifted the freeze previously imposed on all funds, 
such that a freeze was no longer imposed on the A, B and 
D funds, but remained in effect on the C funds. 4 We, 
therefore, have jurisdiction to review the orders lifting the 
freeze. 
 
Further, insofar as the appeals from the procedural 
orders complain of the denial of appellants' procedural 
rights in connection with the hearing which culminated in 
the modification of the freeze order, we view them as 
appealable along with, and as part of, the appeal from the 
orders lifting the freeze. See Energy Action Educ. Found. v. 
Andrus, 654 F.2d 735, 745 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(explaining that appellate review under S 1292(a)(1) extends 
to "all matters inextricably bound up with the[preliminary 
injunction]"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Watt v. 
Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151 (1981); see also 
16 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure S 3921.1 (2d ed. 1987) (stating that review 
under S 1292(a)(1) "is not rigidly limited" but "properly 
extends to all matters inextricably bound up with the 
injunction decision"). 
 
The appeal of the fee order entered during the 
receivership stands on a different jurisdictional footing, 
and, we find, lacks a satisfactory footing. Appellants claim 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As stated in the September 26 freeze order, the freeze order did not 
involve an actual transfer of funds out of any accounts, but only involved 
notifying the financial institutions holding any frozen funds that they 
must "retain within [their] control and prohibit the withdrawal, removal, 
transfer or other disposal of any such funds or other assets." As such, 
the lifting of the freeze did not result in any movement or transfer of 
funds, but only removed the prohibition on the use or movement of these 
funds and notified the same financial institutions that they were now 
permitted to allow access to the previously frozen funds. 
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jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(2), the practical 
finality doctrine, and/or the collateral order doctrine. The 
practical finality doctrine does not provide jurisdiction for 
review since this doctrine only allows appellate review of 
judgments that are final except for ministerial or 
mechanical tasks and that conclusively determine the 
rights of the parties. See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201 
(1848). In this case, the fee order awarding approximately 
$1.6 million in fees, which we assume would be paid from 
the pooled account, does not determine the rights of the 
parties to this litigation since the District Court has not yet 
determined ownership of the pooled account funds or 
ordered a final distribution of the receivership assets.5 See 
also Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 27 F.3d 931, 
935-36 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the practicalfinality 
doctrine did not apply to the order at issue since the court 
still had to determine the highly contested issue of the 
amount of damages and thus, more than merely ministerial 
tasks remained). The collateral order doctrine does not 
provide jurisdiction for review since this order is not, as 
required by this narrow doctrine, "separate from the merits" 
and "effectively unreviewable on appeal from afinal 
judgment." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 
368, 375 (1981). Instead, this order, or at least the 
practical effect of this order, is intimately related to the 
undecided issue of the ownership of the pooled account 
funds and a final distribution of the receivership assets. In 
addition, there is no reason why this fee order could not be 
reviewed following a final judgment. See, e.g. , Law Offices 
of Beryl A. Birndorf v. Joffe, 930 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that a fee award is not appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine as it could be effectively reviewed 
following a final judgment because it did not cause 
irreparable harm in the interim). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. By addressing what appellants term "the practical finality doctrine," 
we do not intend to advance this doctrine as a viable means of obtaining 
appellate jurisdiction. As we noted in Kelly v. Mellon Bank E. Nat'l 
Assoc. 
(In re Kelly), 876 F.2d 14, 15 (3d Cir. 1989), the practical finality 
doctrine as explained in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 
148 (1964) has, at best, very limited viability. 
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Further, S 1292(a)(2) does not provide jurisdiction for the 
appeal from the fee order since this provision is interpreted 
narrowly to permit appeals only from the three discrete 
categories of receivership orders specified in the statute, 
namely orders appointing a receiver, orders refusing to 
wind up a receivership, and orders refusing to take steps to 
accomplish the purposes of winding up a receivership. See 
State St. Bank v. Brockrim, Inc., 87 F.3d 1487, 1490 (1st 
Cir. 1996) (holding that an order was not appealable under 
S 1292(a)(2) since it did not come within one of the three 
discrete categories described in the statute); SEC v. 
American Principal Holdings, Inc., 817 F.2d 1349, 1350 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (holding that an order confirming compensation 
payment to a receiver was not appealable under 
S 1292(a)(2)). This fee order is not of the same character as 
other orders that have been held to fit within the scope of 
S 1292(a)(2). 
 
We will therefore only address the propriety of the orders 
lifting the freeze and the procedural orders entered by the 
District Court in connection therewith. We review the 
District Court's application of law with regard to the 
equitable receivership de novo, and its decisions relating to 
procedures it will follow in connection with the receivership 
proceedings for abuse of discretion. See American Telephone 
& Telegraph Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 
F.3d 1421,1427 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
III. STANDING 
 
Before proceeding to the merits of the appeal, we must 
address intervenors' challenge to appellants' right to bring 
this appeal based on the fact that appellants were not 
parties to the underlying District Court action and were not 
granted intervenor status until the District Court's May 22, 
1998 order. Intervenors base their argument on Marino v. 
Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 (1988) (affirming judgments dismissing 
appeals of nonparties because of nonparty status). Marino 
is not controlling in this instance, however, since the 
nonparties at issue in Marino chose not to move to 
intervene, whereas in this case, appellants did so move. 
Marino only requires that a court deny an appeal from 
nonparties who have not obtained or sought intervenor 
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status, and that such nonparties "seek intervention for 
purposes of appeal." Id. at 304. The case at hand is also 
distinguishable from the other case cited by intervenors, 
SEC v. Wozniak, 33 F.3d 13, 15 (7th Cir. 1994). In 
Wozniak, the court held it had no jurisdiction over an 
appeal of two nonparties where one party never moved to 
intervene and the other party failed to appeal the denial of 
his motion to intervene. We find that appellants, who 
sought and were granted intervenor status as a matter of 
right in the District Court's May 22, 1998 order, have 
standing to bring this appeal. See Kowal v. Malkemus, 965 
F.2d 1136, 1141 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Permission to intervene 
as of right endows the intervenor with appellate standing to 
challenge an adverse judgment entered in the adversary 
proceeding."). 
 
IV. PROPRIETY OF THE ORDERS LIFTING THE FREEZE 
 
In its May 11, 1998 and May 22, 1998 orders, the 
District Court lifted the freeze as to the A, B and D clients' 
funds. We hold that the District Court did not err in so 
doing. We reject appellants' characterization of the District 
Court's May 11, 1998 and May 22, 1998 orders lifting the 
freeze. Contrary to appellants' urgings, the court did not, 
pursuant to these orders, adjudicate claims and decide that 
the A, B and D clients "are entitled to receive all of their 
funds" or that the C clients "should bear all of the 
$70,000,000 in losses." The court's orders did not 
distribute property, decide claims, or bar consideration of 
alleged taints. The order is clear that it did not decide 
claims, stating, "this Order does not constitute a final 
adjudication of any claims by or between investment 
advisory clients." Rather, the District Court only determined 
that, based upon the factual record regarding the 
relationship of the A, B, C and D accounts to the 
defendants, the court lacked power over the A, B and D 
funds. The Trustee's investigation revealed that the 
injunction initially imposed pursuant to the freeze order 
was overly broad, and the District Court therefore modified 
the terms of the restraint. The District Court did this after 
it was convinced "that the Defendants did not have `control' 
over funds maintained by Category A, B, or D clients. . . 
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so as to permit this Court to freeze the funds pursuant to 
15 U.S.C. SS 78u(d) and (e)." Implicit in the District Court's 
ruling was a finding that the Trustee's investigation had not 
adduced any proof either that the Category A, B or D funds 
were, or could be deemed, assets of the defendants, or that 
the investors themselves were implicated as "wrongdoers" 
and thus within the purview of 15 U.S.C. SS 78u(d) and (e).6 
 
The SEC argues in its brief that the District Court had 
the authority to impose and to continue the asset freeze 
over the A, B and D accounts pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 66 since the freeze was part of an ongoing 
receivership proceeding governed by the jurisdictional 
provisions of the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. 
SS 77v(a), 78aa, 80b-14. However, the case law cited by the 
SEC actually supports the District Court's determination 
that the freeze as to these funds was improper because in 
no case referenced by the SEC has it been granted a freeze 
ex parte of assets where those assets were anything other 
than property, or deemed property, of a defendant or of a 
culpable third party. See, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 
413-14 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Nothing in the statute or case law 
suggests that 15 U.S.C. S 78u(d) or (e) authorizes a court to 
freeze the assets of a non-party, one against whom no 
wrongdoing is alleged."). Although the SEC and appellants 
cite many cases that they claim stand for the proposition 
that the SEC can freeze assets of a nonculpable third party, 
all of these cases are distinguishable from the case at hand. 
For example, in Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 
U.S. 282, 284 (1940), where assets frozen were in the 
hands of a third party, the assets were clearly en route to 
the defendant and actually belonged to the defendant. In In 
re San Vicente Med. Partners Ltd., 962 F.2d 1402, (9th Cir. 
1992), the frozen third-party assets at issue were owned by 
a limited partnership, whose general partner was a 
subsidiary of the defendant and thus, the defendant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although not stated, we assume it was crucial to the court's view that 
the C accounts should remain subject to the freeze, that these accounts 
were not merely accounts in the names of individual investors, but, 
rather, were commingled funds in a pooled account in the name of FMS 
at Mid-State Bank. They, clearly, were funds over which the defendants 
had control. 
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controlled the third party's property as a matter of law. See 
also SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1998) (allowing 
the court to name an innocent third party as a "nominal 
defendant" in order to recover proceeds of fraud); SEC v. 
Wencke, 783 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing 
claim of a nonparty based only on the decreased value of 
the nonparty's assets, not on the freezing of assets or a 
disgorgement order affecting the nonparty); SEC v. 
Universal Financial, 760 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(inapplicable because it relates to a stay of legal 
proceedings, as opposed to a freeze of assets, applicable to 
a nonparty); Tcherepnin v. Franz, 485 F.2d 1251, 1257 (7th 
Cir. 1973) (stating that the court could assume jurisdiction 
over land held by nonparties where the nonparties were not 
good faith purchasers for value and were instruments in 
defendants' fraudulent scheme); SEC v. Comcoa, Ltd., 887 
F. Supp. 1521 (S.D. Fla.) (holding that funds in a trust 
account held by defendants' lawyer on behalf of defendants 
were subject to freeze), aff'd sub nom. Levine v. Comcoa, 
Ltd., 70 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Antar, 831 F. 
Supp. 380 (D.N.J. 1993) (stating that the court could 
assume jurisdiction over illegal profits where such profits 
were held by the wife and children of defendant). The SEC 
also cites as support for its argument SEC v. Institutional 
Treasury Management, Inc., No. 91-6715 RG, 1991 SEC 
LEXIS 2791 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 1991). This case does not 
support the SEC's argument, however, since in this case 
too the court released the funds of the innocent investors. 
See SEC v. Institutional Treasury Management, Inc., No. 91- 
6715 RG, 1991 SEC LEXIS 2915 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1991). 
 
In addition, appellants do not argue complicity by the A, 
B and D investors, but contend that, under a "common 
enterprise" theory, the A, B and D accounts are liable for 
funds expended from the C accounts and used to the 
benefit of the investors having funds in A, B and D 
accounts. While we recognize the potential for recovery for 
the C investors from A, B and D investors who allegedly 
benefitted, this situation does not contain the level of 
complicity or involvement in wrongdoing on behalf of the A, 
B and D investors that is necessary to support the 
unilateral freeze of assets under the statute as occurred 
here. See, e.g., Cherif, 933 F.2d at 413-14 (district court 
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not authorized to freeze the assets of a non-party against 
whom no wrongdoing is alleged under 15 U.S.C. S 78u(d) or 
(e)). Although the Trustee's report discussed the existence 
of evidence showing commingling and transfers between the 
pooled and non-pooled accounts, there is no evidence that 
this was done by anyone other than defendants. Transfers 
or invasion of the pooled account for the benefit of others 
accomplished by FMS or Devon do not implicate the A, B 
and D investors in such a way as to make their assets the 
proper subject of a freeze based on defendants' wrongdoing. 
 
Further, appellants' characterization of the District Court 
as having "refused" to decide the issue of who should bear 
the loss of the alleged "taints" is not entirely accurate. The 
District Court did not refuse to decide the "taints" issue, 
but, rather, this issue is, as it should be, reserved for 
another day. Nothing in the relinquishment of the freeze 
over the A, B and D accounts prevents the Trustee from 
pursuing the issue of "taints."7  Further, as has become 
clear from our review of the record of proceedings before the 
District Court and the Bankruptcy Court, the Trustee's 
pursuit of these causes of action to recover the taints from 
the A, B and D account holders has not been cast aside, 
but remains of key concern. These causes of action may 
well constitute important assets, the pursuit of which is at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Trustee, too, objected to lifting the freeze as to any of the 
allegedly 
tainted funds in the A, B and D accounts. However, assuming that the 
Trustee's argument in this regard would be similar to that of the SEC, 
which filed a brief and argued before us, we see no merit in this 
position. 
It appears that the Trustee's position is based primarily upon the desire 
to pursue causes of action against these allegedly tainted funds, but, as 
we have indicated, we view that as an issue separate and apart from the 
issue as to whether the court had power over these assets initially, 
sufficient to justify the issuance of the ex parte order. The fact that 
the 
Trustee wants to have these assets under his control in order to claim 
recovery from them does not constitute legal support for their continued 
freeze pursuant to the initial ex parte order. We also note that no party 
has argued that lifting the freeze would result in the dissipation or 
removal of assets from the jurisdiction of the court. To the contrary, the 
investors whose funds are in these accounts are school districts 
presumably with ample funding, who are available to receive service of 
process. 
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the very heart of these proceedings.8 In fact, we note and 
applaud the Bankruptcy Judge's concern for this issue as 
reflected in his refusal to dismiss the bankruptcy case, 
stating: 
 
       We . . . find it advisable to permit these bankruptcy 
       cases to proceed to determine whether they provide a 
       better process for resolving issues left unresolved by 
       the district court. 
 
We read in these words an appropriate concern that assets 
are properly marshaled and distributions properly ordered 
in connection with a reorganization or liquidation of these 
debtors. 
 
Appellants also object to the method of distribution of 
any funds released from the freeze. Appellants argue that 
the released funds should be divided pro rata among all 
categories of investors, as opposed to among only the A, B 
and D investors, and, more importantly, that the losses in 
the pooled account should be borne by all of defendants' 
clients, as opposed to just the C clients. Intervenors argue 
that the District Court's orders were proper, with the A, B 
and D investors getting back 100% of their principal, and 
the losses in the pooled account being divided pro rata 
among the C investors only. Since the District Court orders 
regarding the distribution of the released funds state clearly 
that they do "not constitute a final adjudication of any 
claims by or between investment advisory clients," and 
leave for another day the pursuit of claims against various 
holders of assets, which would in essence result in a 
redistribution of assets, the orders we have been asked to 
review do not constitute final rulings on asset distribution, 
and this issue, therefore, is not properly before us on this 
appeal. 
 
In summary, the District Court's orders lifting the freeze 
as to the A, B and D accounts were based upon a sound 
legal footing.9 Further, in issuing these orders, it did not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We express no opinion as to which forum is appropriate for this 
pursuit but assume that the best interests of all creditors and the 
Trustee's fulfillment of his fiduciary and statutory duties will guide the 
proceedings. 
 
9. The fact that the court, although stating that it did not propose to 
address the freeze at that time, nonetheless sua sponte dissolved the 
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determine claims, foreclose pursuit of taints, or in any way 
resolve disputes or final distributions among the parties. 
 
V. PROPRIETY OF THE PROCEDURAL ORDERS 
 
Appellants also complain that the procedural orders 
entered by the District Court denied them discovery and 
prevented them from introducing evidence during the 
hearing which culminated in the orders lifting the freeze. 
The proceedings at issue spanned two days. A designated 
representative from each category of investors was 
permitted to raise objections to the modification of the 
freeze and was given a set amount of time for oral 
argument. In addition, a representative from each category 
of investors was allowed to cross-examine a designated 
witness regarding the Price Waterhouse accounting 
analysis, as well as the SEC official who oversaw the 
investigation of defendants, and was permitted to present 
testimony by way of an affidavit or expert report in support 
of any filed objections. Also, the legal position appellants 
urge, which was the position advanced by the Trustee and 
the SEC that assets subject to the alleged taints should 
remain subject to the freeze, had been fully briefed by the 
Trustee and the SEC prior to the time that the District 
Court issued its May 11 order lifting the freeze from these 
assets. 
 
We note that where there is a receiver with equitable 
power in a proceeding before it, the District Court has wide 
discretion as to how to proceed. See Elliott, 953 F.2d at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
freeze as to the A, B and D accounts following the April 29 hearing 
regarding the Trustee's motion to modify the restraining order does not 
change this analysis. As discussed infra, the court has wide discretion in 
fashioning proceedings with regard to an equitable receivership. SEC v. 
Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting court's wide 
discretion to determine relief in equity receivership), rev'd in part on 
other 
grounds, 998 F.2d 922 (11th Cir. 1993). Further, this issue had been 
fully briefed by the SEC and the Trustee, with the Trustee taking 
appellants' position that the court should not release these funds. 
Appellants have not argued how further factual development of this issue 
would have led to a different result since it had already been adequately 
developed. 
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1566 (noting court's wide discretion to determine relief in 
equity receivership); SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1040 
(9th Cir. 1986) (noting that a court may use summary 
proceedings to determine relief in equity receivership). 
Appellants have failed to advance a theory or posit a 
relevant rule or case precedent that would have been the 
basis for continuing the freeze if they had not been 
thwarted in their effort to obtain the necessary proof. Even 
assuming that appellants had an arguable right to the 
procedural protections they seek, they have failed to show 
how they were prejudiced or harmed by the summary 
proceedings, since they have articulated no theory whereby 
a freeze could possibly have been appropriate as to the A, 
B or D funds. See Elliott, 953 F.2d at 1567 (stating that 
"appellants must show how they were prejudiced by the 
summary proceedings and how they would have been better 
able to defend their interests in a plenary proceeding"); 
Wencke, 783 F.2d at 837-38 (holding that summary 
proceedings are sufficient where party failed to show how 
he was prejudiced by such proceedings). 
 
Again, the fact that appellants may wish to pursue a 
cause of action for recovery of taints, even under a common 
enterprise theory, does not constitute a basis for a freeze of 
assets ex parte at the behest of the SEC. Since legal action 
in pursuit of the taints is clearly contemplated in the 
receivership or the bankruptcy proceedings, no harm has 
been done by the court's implementation of certain 
procedures for the conduct of the April 29 hearing. 
 
Accordingly, we find that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in conducting the hearing in the manner it 
did. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, as pertaining to the freeze 
orders and the procedural orders, the District Court orders 
are affirmed. This appeal from the fee order is dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
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